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FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND COMPELLED
PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE PAPERS AFTER
FISHER AND DOE
INTRODUCTION
White collar crime1 may be "the most serious and all-pervasive crime
problem in America today."2 The Department of Justice has made white
collar crime, including corporate wrongdoing, its highest priority.' Reg-
ulation of corporate misconduct poses unique problems.' Corporations
frequently conceal their illegal activity in complex transactions that com-
mingle legitimate business with illegal pursuits.5 Because corporate
wrongdoing often leaves only a "paper trail," 6 effective law enforcement
requires access to corporate records.' Recent interpretations of the fifth
1. Congress defines white collar crime as "an illegal act or series of illegal acts com-
mitted by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property,
to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal
advantage." Justice System Improvement Act, § 901(a)(18), 42 U.S.C. § 3791(a)(18)
(1982); see Conyers, Corporate and White-Collar Crime: A View by the Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 287, 287 n.l (1980). White collar
crime includes bribery, kickbacks, payoffs, computer crime, consumer fraud, business
fraud, securities fraud, illegal competition, embezzlement, pilferage, receiving stolen
property, securities thefts, product safety violations, environmental violations, antitrust
violations and fraud against the government. See id. at 288 & n.4.
2. Conyers, supra note 1, at 288; see also Simon & Swart, The Justice Department
Focuses on White-Collar Crime Promises and Pitfalls, 30 Crime & Delinq. 107, 108
(1984) ("a veritable corporate crime wave in the last few years"). See generally D. Simon
& D. Eitzen, Elite Deviance vii-viii (1982) (sociological study exploring serious and rep-
resentative forms of wrongdoing by wealthy and powerful individuals in corporate and
governmental organizations). Official estimates of the annual cost of white collar crime
range from 40 billion to $200 billion. See Conyers, supra note 1, at 297. In comparison,
the annual loss attributable to crimes against property is estimated at S4 billion. See id. at
288.
3. See Heymann, White-Collar Crime Symposium, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 271, 271
(1980); Simon & Swart, supra note 2, at 108; Webster, An Examination of FBI Theory
and Methodology Regarding White-Collar Crime Investigation and Prevention, 17 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 275, 279 (1980). Corporate crime can be viewed as a subset of white collar
crime involving "managerial direction, participation, or acquiescence in illegal business
acts." Conyers, supra note 1, at 287 n.1 (quoting Corporate Criminal Liability Hearings
on HR. 4973 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1980) (statement of Ralph Nader & Mark Green)).
4. See Applegate, The Business Papers Rule: Personal Privacy and White Collar
Crime, 16 Akron L. Rev. 189, 190 (1982).
5. See H. Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime 27
(1970); Applegate, supra note 4, at 192-93; Vaira, Use of the Grand Jury to Obtain Busi-
ness Records, 59 Chi. B. Rec. 32, 32 (1977).
6. Applegate, supra note 4, at 197; see United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700
(1944) ("The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its repre-
sentatives is usually to be found in the official records and documents of that
organization.").
7. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) ("Were the cloak of the privi-
lege to be thrown around [organizational] records and documents, effective enforcement
of many federal and state laws would be impossible.") (quoting United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911) ("The
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amendment,' however, may jeopardize this vital access9 by allowing cus-
todians of corporate papers to resist compulsory production of the papers
by invoking their personal privilege against self-incrimination.' 0
Traditionally, the custodian of an organization's records could not re-
sist a subpoena for their production on fifth amendment grounds, even
though producing them might tend to incriminate him. " Two rationales
[state's] reserved power of visitation would seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly de-
feated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers could refuse inspection of the records and
papers of the corporation."); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) ("If. . . an
officer or employ6 of a corporation. . . could refuse to produce the books and documents
...it would result in the failure of a large number of cases where the illegal combination
was determinable only upon the examination of such papers."); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2259b, at 360-61 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ("economic crimes [by corporations]
are usually not even discoverable without access to business records") (emphasis in origi-
nal); Applegate, supra note 4, at 193 (investigation of white collar crime "first requires
access to large amounts of documentary evidence, and then requires careful evaluation of
complex contents of the documents"); Vaira, supra note 5, at 32 (enforcement requires
"extensive examination of financial records in order to follow the often complicated and
sophisticated methods devised to hide illegal transactions").
8. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amend-
ment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 3, 6 (1964).
9. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text and infra notes 51-52, 148-51 and
accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 775 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1986); In re Grand Jury, 773 F.2d 45, 47 (3d Cir.
1985) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 525-26, 529 (3d Cir.
1985) (en banc); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d
Cir. 1985); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MIA)
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 611 F. Supp. 16, 24 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Note, Organizational Pa-
pers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 640, 640-41, 654
(1986) [hereinafter cited as Organizational Papers].
Although the Harvard note interprets In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 722
F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983), to hold that a custodian of organizational papers can claim a
privilege, see Organizational Papers, supra, at 640 n.4, the privilege was allowed only
because the documents were held in a personal capacity, not in a representative capacity.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 722 F.2d 981, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 85-2171, slip. op. at 7 (8th Cir. Feb. 21, 1986).
Other circuits continue to deny the privilege to custodians of organizational records.
See id. at 6-7; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln), 767 F.2d 1130,
1131 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. G & G Advertising, 762 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.
1985); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984);
United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1189 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d
1051, 1053 (1st Cir. 1980).
11. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 77, 80 (1913); Wheeler v.
United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85
(1911); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
74-75 (1906). See generally C. McCormick, McCormick On Evidence §§ 128-129 (3d ed.
1984) (discussing the privilege with respect to corporations, associations and their
agents); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, at §§ 2259a-2259b (same); White Collar Crime-
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justified denying the privilege to the custodian.1 2 First, a collective entity
enjoys no privilege because it is not a "person" within the scope of the
fifth amendment.1 3 Since a collective entity can act only through its
agents, to permit each agent to assert his personal fifth amendment privi-
leges would grant the entity a de facto privilege,"' thereby extending the
fifth amendment beyond its scope.'5 Accordingly, the organization's
agents acting in a representative capacity assume its duty to produce its
documents and thereby implicitly waive their privilege.1 6 The second ra-
tionale was rooted in privacy concerns.' 7 Compulsory production of an
individual's private papers violated the fifth amendment protection of his
legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal papers." Because the
privilege applied only to an individual's private papers, 9 the lack of any
privacy interest in an organization's papers2' prevented their custodian
Third Annual Survey of Law, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 279, 560, 564-65 (1984) (same) [here-
inafter cited as Survey]. See infra notes 32, 43-73 and accompanying text.
12. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974).
13. See id. at 89-90; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99, 701 (1944); C.
McCormick, supra note 11, § 128, at 311.
14. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699-701 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 384, 386 (1911); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert
denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 530 (3d
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 536 (Garth, J., dissenting); In re Two
Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327-28 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 536 (Garth, J., dissenting); In re Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1985).
16. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); Curcio v. United States, 354
U.S. 118, 123-25 (1957); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1911); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 129, at 312.
See infra notes 42, 57-58, 101, 122-23 and accompanying text.
17. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327 (1973); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-78, 380 (1911); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
18. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335 (1973). See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
19. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
20. The Bellis Court defined an organization as an entity with an existence independ-
ent of its individual members. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1974).
Distinguishing between individual and organizational records can be problematic. See
Note, On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for Mixed Purpose Documents: The Problem of
Categorizing Documents as Personal or Corporate in a Business Setting, 17 U.S.F.L Rev.
333, 333-34 (1983). To qualify as an organizational document for fifth amendment pur-
poses, a document must belong to an organization that maintains a distinct set of organi-
zational records and recognizes in its members a right of control and access to them.
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93 (1976). "In other words, it must be fair to say that
the records demanded are the records of the organization rather than those of the individ-
ual. . . ." Id. The size of the organization is not dispositive. See id. at 100-01. The issue
of whether the documents are possessed in a personal or representative capacity is often
confused with the issue of whether documents possessed in a personal capacity are pro-
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from asserting his personal privilege.2"
In Fisher v. United States,22 however, the Supreme Court propounded
a literal interpretation of the fifth amendment2 3 and repudiated the no-
tion that the fifth amendment directly addresses privacy interests.2 4 The
Court stated that the fifth amendment protects individuals only from
compelled self-incrimination, not from disclosure of private informa-
tion.25 Thus, when the government subpoenas an individual's docu-
ments, the fifth amendment inquiry focuses on the testimony implicit in
the act of producing the documents, not the private character of the doc-
uments.26 After Fisher, the sole criterion in analyzing any claim of privi-
lege with respect to documents held in a personal capacity27 is whether
the act of production constitutes compelled testimony that might incrim-
inate the producer.2 8
Based on the demise of the privacy rationale, some authorities con-
strue Fisher to create a privilege for custodians of organizational records
when their act of producing the records is testimonial and self-incrimi-
nating.29 This interpretation misreads the shift in fifth amendment juris-
tected by the privilege. See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents -
Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 439, 440 n.1, 441 n.5 (1984). Some au-
thorities contend that the distinction between an individual's and a corporation's docu-
ments is irrelevant after Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See infra notes 87-
90 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this Note argues that Fisher supports the tradi-
tional distinction between organizational and private papers. See infra notes 86, 91-113
and accompanying text.
21. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699-700 (1944).
22. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
23. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) ("We cannot cut the Fifth
Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a
general protector of privacy.
24. See id. at 399-401.
25. See id. at 401.
26. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-14 (1984). The Fisher Court noted
that special problems of privacy might exist when personal diaries are subpoenaed. See
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976). Whether these privacy problems impli-
cated the fourth or fifth amendments was left ambiguous. See id. at 415 n. I (Brennan, I.,
concurring).
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984); Organizational Papers,
supra note 10, at 641-42, 644. After Fisher, the Court applied the act of production
rationale to quash a subpoena for a sole proprietor's business papers. See United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984).
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit has held that, after
Fisher and Doe, a custodian of corporate records can resist a subpoena for corporate
records when production would incriminate him. See In re Grand Jury, 773 F.2d 45, 47
(3d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
bane); see also Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 641-42 (arguing that the demise of
privacy invalidates the collective entity rule). The Second Circuit has stated, in dictum,
that a limited exception to the collective entity rule exists when the custodian's act of
production would be self-incriminating. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces
Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (dictum). This "exception," however, would be
coextensive with the scope of the privilege with respect to private documents after Fisher.
See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. Thus, the Second Circuit's interpretation,
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prudence embodied in Fisher.3" Moreover, reading Fisher as authority
for permitting corporate agents to claim the privilege disregards nearly
eighty years of precedent unequivocally denying the existence of such a
privilege.31
This Note argues that a custodian has no fifth amendment privilege to
resist the compulsory production of organizational documents he holds
in a representative capacity. In accepting the duties of a custodian, the
agent impliedly waives any personal privilege with respect to organiza-
tional documents. Part I analyzes the evolution of the collective entity
rule and concludes that Fisher entrenched rather than qualified the rule.
Part II then examines the implied waiver rationale underlying the collec-
tive entity rule and concludes that it conforms with the fifth amendment
and promotes the public interest by allowing the government to police
corporate misconduct.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY RULE
For nearly eighty years, the Supreme Court has held that "an individ-
ual cannot rely upon [his personal fifth amendment] privilege to avoid
producing the records of a collective entity which are in his possession in
a representative capacity, even if these records might incriminate him
personally."32 Prior to Fisher v. United States,3 the Supreme Court
predicated the collective entity rule34 on both the absence of any privacy
which creates a privilege for corporate custodians, would be the rule rather than the
exception.
30. See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
31. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) ("This Court has also time
and again allowed subpoenas against the custodian of corporate documents or those be-
longing to other collective entities."); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974) ("A
long line of cases has established that an individual cannot rely upon the privilege to
avoid producing the records of a collective entity which are in his possession in a repre-
sentative capacity."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147
(6th Cir.) (en banc) (nothing in Fisher or Doe "supports an inference that the collective
entity rule, developed by the Supreme Court over a period of nearly 80 years, was over-
ruled sub silentio"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),
768 F.2d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Garth, J., dissenting) (Granting the privilege
to a corporate custodian is contrary to "nearly eighty years of unvarying and continuous
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary."); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Since 1906 the Supreme Court has regarded the
distinction between an individual and a corporation as vitally important in determining
the reach of the fifth amendment."). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974). See supra note 11, 31 and accom-
panying text.
33. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
34. One commentator has referred to this principle as the "representative capacity
doctrine." See Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd- Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in
the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 343, 365 (1979). Others refer to the rule as the
"collective entity" rule. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143,
145 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter
(Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting).
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interest in the organization's documents 35 and the custodian's assump-
tion of the organization's obligation to produce its documents for govern-
ment inspection.36 In Fisher, the Supreme Court disclaimed privacy as a
criterion that determines the scope of the privilege.37
Some authorities interpret the demise of privacy as the deathknell of
the collective entity rule.38 If this interpretation is correct, the Fisher
Court overruled sub silentio eighty years of unbroken precedent. 39 These
authorities contend that Fisher implicitly extended the privilege to an
organization's agent holding documents in a representative capacity. 40
In disavowing the privacy rationale, however, the Court contracted the
scope of the privilege and did not retreat from the collective entity rule.41
Instead, Fisher underscored the implied waiver theory underlying the
collective entity rule.42
A. From Boyd to Belli" The Dual Bases of the
Collective Entity Rule
In Boyd v. United States,4 3 the Supreme Court held that, because pro-
tecting individual privacy was a primary purpose of the privilege against
35. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text and infra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text and infra notes 57-58, 101 and accom-
panying text.
37. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-11 & n.8 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 644. See supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text and infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 10, 29 and accompanying text and infra notes 40, 87-91 and ac-
companying text.
39. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d
525, 532 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting). See supra notes 11, 31 and
accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
bane) ("[Fisher and Doe] make the significant factor, for the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, neither the nature of the entity which owns documents, nor the contents of docu-
ments, but rather the communicative or noncommunicative nature of the arguably
incriminating disclosures sought to be compelled."); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae
Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) ("In certain limited circumstances, how-
ever, an individual may have a fifth amendment privilege against being personally com-
pelled to produce corporate documents."); Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 642
("[Fisher's] compelled testimony standard permits no principled distinction between per-
sonal and organizational documents."). See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 95-99, 100 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 93-95, 106-09 and accompanying text.
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Supreme Court first extended the privilege
against self-incrimination to compulsory production of private papers. Boyd's holding
would be reiterated without question for the next 90 years. See Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 419 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also C. McCormick, supra note
11, § 126, at 306 (discussing the privilege as related to compulsory production of docu-
ments); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2264, at 379-80 & n.1 (same); Survey, supra note
11, at 564 (same). In this context, "private" is used to distinguish documents owned by
an individual from those owned by an organization. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
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self-incrimination, the fifth amendment proscribed the compulsory pro-
duction of private papers.' In subsequent decisions, the Court proved
reluctant to extend the privilege to all categories of private property.45
Logically, Boyd's rationale would allow any owner of private property,
including corporations, to invoke the fifth amendment when the govern-
ment legitimately seeks access to that property.46
A corporation, however, is a fictional entity created by the state and
enjoys only those rights and privileges the state sees fit to confer.47 A
corporation holds its documents subject to the state's reserved right of
visitation, which permits the government to inspect them for any legiti-
mate purpose.4' Thus, in Hale v. Henkel,49 the Supreme Court upheld a
contempt order issued against a corporate official who refused to produce
corporate records on the ground that the corporation would be incrimi-
nated.5 ° The Court stated that illegal corporate activities were generally
44. See id. at 630, 634-35. Two years before Fisher, the Supreme Court stated that
"[p]rotection of individual privacy was the major theme running through the Court's
decision in Boyd." Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974). One commentator,
however, discerns two stages in the development of the privacy rationale. See Heidt,
supra note 20, at 442, 444. In the early stage, property rights were paramount. Id. As
long as the person subpoenaed possessed the property and either owned it or held a prop-
erty interest superior to the party issuing the subpoena, he could suppress the property.
See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); Heidt, supra note 20, at 448. Later
interpretations of Boyd, however, emphasized the protection of individual privacy. See
Beflis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974); Heidt, supra note 20, at 457-58. Under
this rationale, the privilege protects certain documents in order to safeguard a person's
"legitimate expectation of privacy," Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973),
and his "private enclave where he may lead a private life," Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-
82 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
45. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 449. See infra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
46. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 444, 449.
47. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); C. McCormick, supra note 11,
§ 128, at 311.
48. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 700 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-85 (1911); C. McCor-
mick, supra note 11, § 128, at 311. In Wilson, the Court explained the relationship be-
tween the fifth amendment and the state's visitatorial powers:
[T]he corporate form of business activity, with its chartered privileges, raises a
distinction when the authority of government demands the examination of
books. That demand, expressed in lawful process, confining its requirements
within the limits which reason imposes in the circumstances of the case, the
corporation has no privilege to refuse. It cannot resist production upon the
ground of self-crimination. Although the object of the inquiry may be to detect
the abuses it has committed, to discover its violations of law and to inflict pun-
ishment by forfeiture of franchises or otherwise, it must submit its books and
papers to duly constituted authority when demand is suitably made. This is
involved in the reservation of the visitatorial power of the State, and in the
authority of the National Government where the corporate activities are in the
domain subject to the powers of Congress.
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
49. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
50. See id. at 74-75.
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discoverable only by examining corporate papers. 5 ' Accordingly, al-
lowing a privilege with respect to corporate records would impermissibly
frustrate the government's visitatorial powers and impede legitimate ef-
forts to regulate corporate conduct.52
Over the next eighty years, the Court delineated the fifth amendment
rights of representatives of corporations, partnerships and other collec-
tive entities. Not once did the Court allow a custodian holding an en-
tity's records in a representative capacity to assert his personal fifth
amendment privilege. 3 In Wilson v. United States,54 the Court held that
a corporate representative could not prevent a corporation from comply-
ing with a documentary subpoena on the basis of his own privilege
against self-incrimination." Although the Court recognized that com-
pelling the custodian to produce corporate documents could be as in-
criminating as compelling him to produce his private papers, 56 it held
that the custodian had waived his privilege. 7 On becoming custodian,
he voluntarily accepted a duty to produce corporate documents that
overrode his personal privilege.5 In United States v. White,59 the Court
extended the collective entity rule to the custodian of union documents.
60
The White Court emphasized that the power to compel production was a
necessary concomitant of the government's duty to police powerful artifi-
cial entities.6'
5 1. See id. at 74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
89 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 382, 384-85 (1911). See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text and infra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 11, 31-32, 39 and accompanying text.
54. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
55. Id. at 384-85. In a companion case, the Court held that a corporate custodian
personally subpoenaed to produce corporate documents could not avoid production. See
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911). Even after the dissolution of a corpo-
ration and the transfer of its books, the transferee cannot invoke the privilege as to corpo-
rate documents. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913). The rule
applies even if the individual is the sole shareholder of a professional corporation. See
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 77, 80 (1913).
56. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 378-79.
57. Id. at 380-82; see Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 703 (1951). See supra notes 16, 42
and accompanying text and infra notes 101, 122-23 and accompanying text.
58. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911) (corporate documents "are
of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny demanded and ... the custodian has
voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim of privilege"). The Court noted
that English common law accorded corporate agents a right against self-incrimination
with respect to production of corporate papers. See id. at 385-86. The Court recognized,
however, that "these [English cases] cannot be deemed controlling. The corporate duty,
and the relation of the appellant as the officer of the corporation to its discharge, are to be
determined by our laws." Id. at 386.
59. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
60. See id. at 701.
61. See id. at 700 ("The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated
and unincorporated organizations and their representatives demand that the constitu-
tional power of the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be corre-
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In 1974, the Court in Bellis v. United States62 held that the collective
entity rule precluded a partner from asserting his privilege to resist the
compelled production of partnership records. 63 Justice Marshall summa-
rized the two rationales that still required the collective entity rule.'
First, because the fifth amendment protects only the natural individual
from compelled self-incrimination, neither an artificial entity, nor its
agents acting in their representative capacities, can invoke the privilege.65
Again the Court reasoned that the economic power of modern collective
entities, readily susceptible to abuse, demands effective government regu-
lation.66 Recognition of the agent's privilege, however, would extend the
privilege to the entity, thus denying the government access to crucial evi-
dence of organizational misconduct-the organization's official docu-
ments.67 Second, the Bellis Court noted that the partner's lack of privacy
interest in partnership records also justified applying the collective entity
rule.6" In the sole dissent, Justice Douglas objected only to the majority's
characterization of a three-man partnership as a collective entity.69
Thus, as of 1974, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the collec-
tive entity rule barred agents of collective entities from asserting their
personal privileges with respect to the entities' documents.70
From Hale to Bellis, the Supreme Court drew a "bright line" between
spondingly effective."). In addition, the White Court explained the need to treat all
collective entities in the same manner for fifth amendment purposes:
IT]he absence of [visitatorial powers over] a particular type of organization does
not lessen the public necessity for making reasonable regulations of its activities
effective, nor does it confer upon such an organization the purely personal privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Basically, the power to compel the production
of the records of any organization, whether it be incorporated or not, arises out
of the inherent and necessary power of the federal and state governments to
enforce their laws....
Id. at 700-01. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text and infra note 66 and ac-
companying text.
62. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
63. Id. at 101.
64. See id. at 89-92.
65. See id. at 90.
66. See id. at 90-91 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)).
67. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90-91. The Court explained this problem as followvs:
In view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce
its records through its individual officers or agents, recognition of the individ-
ual's claim of privilege with respect to the financial records of the organization
would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the organization it-
self is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege, and largely frus-
trate legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations.
Id. at 90.
68. See id. at 91-92.
69. See id. at 101-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. The custodian may, however, refuse to give oral testimony concerning corporate
matters that would be personally incriminating. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118,
124-25 (1957). If the custodian has already produced the documents, then he can be
compelled to authenticate them orally. United States v. Austin-Bagley, 31 F.2d 229, 234
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
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documents belonging to an organization and documents belonging to an
individual.7" When a subpoena duces tecum sought the former, the pos-
sessor could not claim his own privilege.72 When an individual's docu-
ments were sought, however, he could invoke his privilege on the basis of
a privacy interest in his own written thoughts.73
B. Fisher and Doe
1. The Demise of Privacy
Two years after Bellis, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States74
rejected the proposition that protection of privacy was a function of the
fifth amendment. 75 Rather, the fifth amendment only protected the indi-
vidual from compelled, self-incriminating testimonial disclosures. 76 Be-
cause the papers in question were voluntarily prepared, their content did
not constitute compelled testimony. 77 The act of producing the docu-
ments, however, may have testimonial and incriminating aspects in-
dependent of the contents.78 Production of documents tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded, their possession or control by the
one producing them, and implicitly authenticates the documents as those
described in the subpoena.79 If this testimony incriminates the producer,
he can invoke the fifth amendment to avoid production. 80
Consequently, the fifth amendment basis for resisting production of
private papers shifted from the individual's privacy interest in their con-
tents to his right not to disclose self-incriminating testimony inherent in
the act of production.8 In Fisher, however, the fifth amendment did not
shield an individual taxpayer's records because his act of producing them
71. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 58-59 (2d Cir.
1985).
72. See supra notes 11, 49-70 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
74. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
75. See id. at 399-401.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976).
78. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; see also Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 645-
47 (explaining how the act of production can be testimonial). Whether the act of produc-
tion involves compelled testimonial communication depends on whether it supplies a nec-
essary link in the evidentiary chain. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern),
771 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985). Does it con-
firm that which was previously unknown to the government, for example, the existence or
location of the papers? Id. Does it supply assurance of authenticity not available to the
government from sources other than the person summoned? Id. The implied admission
that a taxpayer possessed fraudulent tax records, for instance, would help to establish the
essential element of scienter. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 478.
79. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. A document is admissible in evidence only after being
authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
80. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-13.
81. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-14 (1984); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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was not self-incriminating testimony.82 In United States v. Doe,8 3 the
Court again applied the act of production rationaleM but held that a sole
proprietor could assert his privilege in response to a subpoena seeking his
business records because compliance might authenticate them.85
2. The Collective Entity Rule After Fisher and Doe
Neither Fisher nor Doe indicated in any way that the Court had sud-
denly cast aside the collective entity rule.86 Nevertheless, some courts
and commentators read Fisher and Doe to create an exception to the col-
lective entity rule when a corporate custodian's act of production consti-
tutes self-incriminating testimony. 7 They reason that because the Court
held privacy interests irrelevant to the fifth amendment, it thereby elimi-
nated the foundations for the collective entity rule.88 Accordingly, they
argue that the different treatment of documents based on their private or
organizational character is no longer valid. 9 Rather, it is the nature of
the testimony implicit in the act of producing the documents that is sig-
nificant, regardless of their ownership.9' This interpretation, however,
misreads the mandate of both Fisher and Doe and ignores statements in
82. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-14. In Fisher, individual taxpayers had turned over
their accountants' workpapers to their attorneys. See id. at 394. Their attorneys, who
were summoned to produce the workpapers, see id., could resist the summons by virtue of
the attorney client privilege only if the workpapers would have been privileged from pro-
duction in their clients' hands. See id. at 404-05. Thus, the Court had to decide whether
"the documents could have been obtained by summons addressed to the taxpayer while
the documents were in his possession." Id. at 405. In this case, the taxpayers' act of
production would not have been testimonial because the existence and location of the
papers were a "foregone conclusion," id. at 411, and because the taxpayers' production
would not have authenticated the accountants' papers, see id. at 412-13; id. at 430 n.9
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The taxpayers] stipulated, however, that the documents in-
volved here exist and are those described in the subpoenas, thereby obviating any prob-
lem as to self-incrimination in these cases resulting from the act of production itself.").
83. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
84. See id. at 612.
85. Id. at 606, 613-14 & nn.11-12.
86. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 145, 147 (6th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985).
87. See supra notes 10, 29 and accompanying text. They reason that because the
custodian's implied admissions are just as likely to be testimonial and incriminating as
that of any individual, no reason exists for compelling the implied admissions of the
custodian but not those of other individuals. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768
F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,
769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces Tecum,
611 F. Supp. 16, 24 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 647-48; see
also Heidt, supra note 20, at 475-76 (noting that, though the implied admissions of custo-
dians are no different than those of other individuals, the Court nonetheless requires a
custodian of organizational papers to produce them when subpoenaed).
88. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 525-28 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc); Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 641-42. See supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text.
89. See supra note 88.
90. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc);
Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 642, 647-48.
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those opinions that directly contradict their conclusion. 91
In both Fisher and Doe, the Court took great care to explain that the
act of production rationale had no effect on the collective entity rule.92
In each case, the Court cited Bellis and its predecessors for the proposi-
tion that the custodian of organizational papers cannot claim his privi-
lege to refuse to produce them under subpoena. 93 Moreover, the Fisher
Court stated that, despite any incrimination implicit in his act of produc-
tion, the agent of collective entity must produce the entity's records on
demand. 94 Thus, the Court apparently accepted the collective entity rule
without hesitation.
The concurring opinions in Fisher demonstrate that the entire Court
assumed the continued validity of the collective entity rule. The concur-
ring opinions criticized the majority not for extending the privilege to
organizational representatives but for its reduction of an existing individ-
ual privilege. 95 Justice Marshall, who only two years earlier authored the
91. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
92. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 145-46, 147 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525,
530 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 532, 538 & n.6 (Garth, J.,
dissenting); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir.
1985). See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
93. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 608 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 411-13 (1976).
94. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 413 & n.14 (1976). Curiously, the Harvard
note argues that Fisher overruled the collective entity rule but never mentions passages in
the Fisher opinion indicating that the Court saw no conflict between the act of production
rationale and the collective entity rule. See Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 643-
48. In two instances, the Fisher Court carefully distinguished situations involving per-
sonal papers from those involving organizational papers. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12,
413 & n.14. In the first instance, the Court stated:
This Court has also time and again allowed subpoenas against the custodian of
corporate documents or those belonging to other collective entities such as un-
ions and partnerships and those of bankrupt businesses over claims that the
documents will incriminate the custodian despite the fact that producing the
documents tacitly admits their existence and their location in the hands of their
possessor. E.g., Wilson v. United States; Dreier v. United States; United States v.
White; Bellis v. United States; In re Harris.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In the second in-
stance, the Court emphasized that organizational papers must be produced despite any
self-incriminating testimony inherent in the act of production:
Moreover, in Wilson v. United States, supra; Dreier v. United States, supra;
United States v. White, supra; Bellis v. United States, supra; and In re Harris,
supra, the custodian of corporate, union, or partnership books or those of a
bankrupt business was ordered to respond to a subpoena for the business' books
even though doing so involved a 'representation that the documents produced
are those demanded by the subpoena'.
Id. at 413 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)). The Court stated
that "[i]n these cases compliance with the subpoena is required even though the books
have been kept by the person subpoenaed and his producing them would itself be suffi-
cient authentication to permit their introduction against him." Id. at 413 n. 14.
95. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 431-32 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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Court's opinion in Bellis,96 disagreed with the majority's rejection of the
privacy rationale,97 but opined that the act of production analysis never-
theless preserved the distinction between corporate documents held in a
representative capacity and private papers held in a personal capacity.98
Similarly, Justice Brennan did not join the majority opinion because he
perceived the "denigration of privacy principles" as a "serious crippling
of the protection secured by the privilege against compelled production
of one's private books and papers."9 9 Justice Brennan also pointed out
that the cases articulating the collective entity rule did not hold that the
act of producing the records of business entities was insufficiently testi-
monial for purposes of the privilege."c Those cases were decided on the
ground that the custodian of organizational documents assumed the cor-
poration's duty to produce its records, thereby waiving his privilege.",
96. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 85 (1974).
97. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
98. See id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring) ('ITlhe Court's rationale provides a per-
suasive basis for distinguishing between the corporate-document cases and those involv-
ing the papers of private citizens."). See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
99. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Nothing in the language of [the repre-
sentative capacity cases], either expressly or impliedly, indicates that the act of produc-
tion with respect to the records of business entities is insufficiently testimonial for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.").
As previously noted, the Court in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), estab-
lished the collective entity rule despite acknowledging that the corporate officer was being
compelled to be a "witness against himself." Id. at 378-79. In United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944), the Court denied the privilege to the custodian of union records even
though the privilege was "designed to prevent the use of legal process to force ... [an
individual] to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might
incriminate him." Id. at 698. The Court explicitly recognized in Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118 (1957), that the "custodian's act of producing books or records in response
to a subpoena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are
those demanded by the subpoena." Id. at 125. Nonetheless, the custodian of corporate
records could claim no privilege. Id. at 122. By accepting custody of corporate records,
the custodian had waived his privilege as to any testimony inherent in his act of produc-
ing them. Id. at 124-25.
101. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("At most, those issues,
though considered, were disposed of on the ground, not that production was insufficiently
testimonial, but that one in control of the records of an artificial organization undertakes
an obligation with respect to those records foreclosing any exercise of his privilege.").
According to Justice Brennan, the majority rationalized the collective entity rule based
on the insufficient testimonial effect of the custodian's act of production. See id. at 428-30
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, he criticized their putative rationale by pointing out that
implied waiver, not insufficient testimonial character, explained the inapplicability of the
fifth amendment to custodians of organizational documents. Id. at 429-30 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall, however, opined that the insufficient testimonial value of
producing organizational documents distinguished them from personal documents. Id. at
432 (Marshall, J., concurring). Nevertheless, it appears that the majority merely indi-
cated that the custodian's act of production was not testimonial when the existence and
the location of the documents were a foregone conclusion. Id. at 411-12. Later in the
opinion, the Court noted that the custodian must produce subpoenaed documents despite
the authentication of the documents inherent in this act of production. See id. at 413 &
n. 14. In any case, since each opinion invoked the collective entity rule to demonstrate the
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Fisher and Doe did not affect the implied waiver rationale underlying
the collective entity rule.'o 2 Neither Fisher nor Doe involved a custodian
of organizational documents involving his personal privilege." 3 Thus,
the Court did not address the implied waiver theory. Only two years
before Fisher was decided, the Bellis Court did address the implied
waiver theory and held that the custodian could claim no privilege be-
cause the organization would thereby gain a de facto privilege. 04 After
Fisher and Doe, Bellis' reasoning remains valid and necessary to ensure
government access to organizational papers.'0 5
Rather than expand the scope of the privilege, Fisher and Doe reduced
its scope with respect to an individual's private papers. 106 Before Fisher,
the fifth amendment applied to the contents of an individual's private
papers. °7 After Fisher, the fifth amendment applies to personal docu-
consistency of its conclusions with existing fifth amendment principles, each Justice ap-
parently assumed the continuing validity of the collective entity rule.
102. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 145-46, 147 (6th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768
F.2d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 536-39 (Garth, J.,
dissenting).
103. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 606; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405; In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985).
In Doe, the Court limited its holding in the very first sentence of the opinion: "This
case presents the issue whether, and to what extent, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination applies to the business records of a sole proprietor-
ship." Doe, 465 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). Similarly, Fisher involved the documents
of an individual taxpayer, not those of a collective entity. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-94,
405. Even the Harvard note, which advocates granting the privilege to custodians of
organizational documents, admits in a footnote that "[tiechnically, Fisher dealt with busi-
ness records of a sole proprietor and rejected the privacy standard only in that context."
Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 641 n.9. To justify extending Fisher beyond its
immediate context, the Harvard note relies on authorities that applied the Fisher holding
to other situations. See id. at 641 n.9. None of these cases, however, involved organiza-
tional documents. See, e.g., Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Fisher inter-
preted to deny fifth amendment protection of private papers of any kind); Fisher, 425 U.S.
at 414-15 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Fisher majority criticized for reducing the fifth
amendment protection offered to private papers); State v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 253,
256, 625 P.2d 316, 319 (1981) (Fisher's act of production rationale applied to preclude the
production of private letters); Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 461, 475 (1981) (Fisher interpreted to deny fifth amendment
protection of private papers of any kind); Formalism, supra note 108, at 978 (Fisher leaves
little protection for private expressions).
104. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94 (1974).
105. See infra notes 117-75 and accompanying text.
106. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 470-72; Comment, Business Records and the Fifth
Amendment Right Against Self Incrimination, 38 Ohio St. L.J. 351, 360-61 (1977); Note,
Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection for the Content of Preexisting Documents:
United States v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023, 1032 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Abolition]. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text. Some judges and commentators have noted that
the trend of the Court's recent decisions has been to narrow the scope of the privilege.
See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring); Note, Constitutional Law:
Search and Seizure of Private Business Records No Longer Supplies Compulsion Necessary
to Invoke the Fifth Amendment, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 376, 386 (1977).
107. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 605, 609 n.6, 610-12; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 418-20 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 430-31 (Marshall, J., concurring); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
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ments only if and to the extent that the act of producing them constitutes
self-incriminating testimony.' Thus, it is unlikely that by reducing the
scope of the privilege with respect to an individual's private papers,1°9
the Court intended to permit custodians of organizational documents to
claim a privilege for the first time. Instead of disturbing the rule, the
disavowal of privacy confirmed that the ultimate basis of the collective
entity rule is the agent's implied waiver of his privilege on voluntarily
assuming custody of organizational documents.'"o
As a group, Bellis, Fisher and Doe require a two step inquiry to deter-
mine the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to documentary
evidence. First, the court must determine whether an individual has a
privilege with respect to the subpoenaed records."' If the papers are
organizational records held in a representative capacity, the inquiry ends
because an agent of a collective entity cannot claim his personal privilege
in these circumstances." 2 If an individual holds records in a personal
capacity, then the court must determine whether the act of production
would be self-incriminating testimony.1 13 Consequently, Fisher and Doe
restricted the scope of the privilege with regard to an individual's records
but did not at the same time extend the privilege to custodians of docu-
ments belonging to a collective entity. The demise of privacy in no way
87-88 (1974); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 527 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 126, at 306; Applegate, supra note 4, at 217-18;
Cramer, Back From the Brink- Boyd's Private Papers Protection and the Sole Proprietor's
Business Records, 21 Am. Bus. L.L 367, 367 (1984); Heidt, supra note 20, at 442, 444;
Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The After-
math of Fisher v. United States, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 683, 683-84 (1982); Note, Formalism.
Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 945-46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Formalism]; Abo-
lition, supra note 107, at 1031; Survey, supra note 11, at 564.
108. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 430-31 (Marshall, J., concurring);
In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 527 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); C. McCor-
mick, supra note 11, § 126, at 306-07; Cramer, supra note 108, at 368-89 & n. 115; Heidt,
supra note 20, at 442, 470-73; Abolition, supra note 107, at 1031; Organizational Papers,
supra note 10, at 644-45.
109. See supra notes 96-100, 107 and accompanying text.
110. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429-30 (Brennan, J., concurring); In re Grand Jury Matter
(Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Becker, J., concurring) ("[T]he
custodian is deemed to have waived his privilege with respect to any testimonial incrimi-
nation inherent in the act of production by acceptance of his corporate position.").
111. In Doe, the Court noted that the Court of Appeals first addressed "whether the
Fifth Amendment ever applies to the records [in question]." Doe, 465 U.S. at 608. After
determining that the privilege could apply to the records of a sole proprietor, "[t]he
Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privi-
leged." Id. The Court did not take issue with this approach.
112. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 608-09. See supra notes 11-16, 32, 63-66, 71-73 and accom-
panying text.
113. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11; In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 145, 147 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1985)
(en banc). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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disturbed the corporate custodian's implied waiver of his personal privi-
lege with respect to corporate documents.
II. IMPLIED WAIVER AND THE DE FACTO CORPORATE PRIVILEGE
Although the collective entity rule survives Fisher and Doe, some au-
thorities question its empirical assumptions" 14 and its constitutional-
ity. 1 5 In contending that regulatory needs may not or should not
override the privilege, these authorities give short shrift to the corporate
custodian's implied waiver." 6 Because the increasing sophistication of
modem corporate crime stymies effective government investigation,
1 7
the regulatory predicate for inferring waiver is even more compelling to-
day than it was eighty years ago.
A. Propriety of Implied Waiver
The implied waiver rationale represents a balance of competing inter-
ests. "8 Balancing the government's interest in effective regulation of cor-
114. See Gerstein, supra note 34, at 372-73; Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at
648-52.
115. See Gerstein, supra note 34, at 368; Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 652-
54. These commentators argue that public policy interests such as law enforcement are
irrelevant in determining the scope of the fifth amendment. See Gerstein, supra note 34,
at 368; Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 652-53. Gerstein argues that balancing
interests, while appropriate to the fourth amendment, is inappropriate to the fifth amend-
ment. See Gerstein, supra note 34, at 368. The Supreme Court and numerous scholars,
however, have indicated that balancing is an integral part of determining the reach of the
fifth amendment. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971); M. Berger, Taking
the Fifth 192 (1980); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 142, at 352-53; 8 J. Wigmore, supra
note 7, § 2259b, at 360; Meltzer, supra note 57, at 715; Formalism, supra note 108, at 967.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
116. Despite general recognition that the collective entity rule is based on implied
waiver, see supra notes 16, 57-58 and accompanying text, the Harvard note does not
discuss the issue. See Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 648-54.
117. See Applegate, supra note 4, at 192-93, 196-98. Seesupra notes 4-7, 9 and accom-
panying text.
118. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971), in which the Court explained
the balance of interests underlying implied waiver:
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the
right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevi-
tably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one
hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other.
Id.; see also id. at 449 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In federal cases stemming from Fifth
Amendment claims, the Court has chiefly derived its standards from consideration of two
factors: the history and purposes of the privilege, and the character and urgency of the
other public interests involved.") (quoting Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1967)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); M. Berger, supra note 115, at 192 ("If the [fifth amendment)
balance weighs in favor of the state, the individual must comply with the regulatory
obligation; if not, his privilege against self-incrimination applies but only as to specific
incriminatory disclosures."); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 142, at 352 ("[T]he ques-
tion becomes whether there is a sufficient public interest to outweigh the strong policy in
favor of maintaining the protection of the privilege."); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7,
§ 2259b, at 360 ("The reason why the privilege is not available to the custodian is that in
this class of cases the arguments supporting efficiency of law enforcement are more per-
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porations against the custodian's claim of privilege, the Supreme Court
has concluded that, despite any possible self-incrimination in producing
corporate documents, a corporate custodian may not assert his personal
privilege. 9 If a corporate agent were allowed to claim his privilege, the
fifth amendment would extend impermissibly to the corporation,1
20
thereby effectively shielding its documents and most of its conduct from
governmental scrutiny.' 2 ' Accordingly, on assuming custody of corpo-
rate documents, the custodian voluntarily accepts the corporation's duty
to produce them. 22 The custodian's duty to produce corporate docu-
ments overrides his personal privilege.
23
Implying a waiver of a constitutional privilege through a balancing of
competing interests is neither impermissible nor unusual.' 24 Despite its
suasive, and the sentiments behind the privilege are less appealing, than in the usual
case."); Meltzer, supra note 57, at 715 ("the governmental need for records to enforce a
particular policy, the existence of a purpose other than getting documentary confessions,
and the extent of the encroachment on the citizen's privacy may all be weighed"); For-
malism, supra note 107, at 967 ("judiciary must now weigh the claimed benefits of exclu-
sion [of privileged evidence] against the societal cost in lost convictions").
119. See supra notes 11-15, 50-73 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 13-65 and accompanying text. The collective entity rule reflects a
fundamental fifth amendment policy: the privilege against self-incrimination protects
only the natural individual. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); C.
McCormick, supra note 11, § 128, at 311; 8 J. Wigmore,supra note 7, § 2259a, at 352-53.
The privilege preserves human dignity by shielding the accused individual from the
abuses of physical compulsion that are likely to grow out of a free license to interrogate.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 698-99 (1944); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 118, at 286; 8 J. Wigmore, supra
note 7, § 2251, at 315-17, 353. Additionally, the privilege tends to protect the individual
from being overwhelmed by the potentially oppressive investigatory and prosecutorial
apparatus of the state. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 118, at
288; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2251, at 318.
Neither rationale requires applying the privilege to a corporation. See 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 7, § 2259a, at 353. An artificial entity cannot be physically abused nor can it
suffer the indignities that the privilege is intended to prevent. Id. Moreover, in our ad-
versarial system of criminal justice, a collective entity is not at the same disadvantage as
the individual. Id. In fact, the state might suffer an insurmountable disadvantage if col-
lective entities could claim a privilege. Id. See supra notes 5-8, 47-48, 57-58 and accom-
panying text. In sophisticated white collar offenses, the privilege may deny the
prosecution the only available evidence. See C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 118, at 286.
See supra notes 4-7, 51-52, 66-67 and accompanying text and infra notes 147-75 and
accompanying text.
Thus, the privilege impedes the state's ability to enforce its laws by depriving it of
access to a valuable source of information-the subject of the investigation itself. See C.
McCormick, supra note 11, § 118, at 286. In the case of a human being, this cost is
acceptable in the interest of preserving individual dignity. See id. at 287. In the case of a
corporation, the absence of this counterbalancing interest renders the cost to society un-
acceptable. See C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 128, at 311; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7,
§ 2259a, at 353.
121. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 16, 57-58, 101 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 16, 36, 57-58 and accompanying text.
124. See, eg., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-28, 431 (1971) (public policy of
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language, the fifth amendment is not absolute.12 5 Even the privilege
against oral self-incrimination, the paradigm of fifth amendment protec-
tion, 126 can be waived impliedly.' 27 By disclosing incriminating informa-
tion on the stand, a witness waives his privilege and must continue to
give relevant testimony, even if self-incriminating. 2 Moreover, records
required to be kept by law 129 must be produced by their custodian even if
production would incriminate him.'30 Furthermore, a driver involved in
promoting civil liability in car accidents outweighs risk of self-incrimination in requiring
driver to stop and report to police); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)
(state interest in integrity of judicial process outweighs witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 839 (2d Cir. 1942) (same), cert. dismissed
as moot, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); see also Meltzer, supra note 57, at 705-06 ("It is true, of
course, that [the privilege] may be subordinated to the community's interest in efficient
regulation"); Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 1752, 1760, 1761 & n.52 (1979) (Supreme Court has balanced the interest
in truth-finding against the interests underlying the fifth amendment privilege in cases
involving testimonial waiver, required records and stop-and-report statutes).
One scholar suggests that such balancing is essential to the continued viability of the
privilege itself. See C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 118, at 288 ("If the privilege is to
remain viable it must retain such flexibility, and it must reflect an appropriate balance
among the wide variety of policy factors as they are affected by the specific context in
which it is invoked."). Fisher itself exemplifies the Court's balancing of competing inter-
ests. See id. § 125, at 305. Compelling the defendant to produce his self-incriminating
and voluntarily written papers runs afoul of the fifth amendment's policy against compel-
ling an individual to assist in establishing his own guilt. Id. Nonetheless, "the limitation
of the privilege to compelled testimonial activities reflects a policy judgment that the
government should not be barred from compelling all defendant assistance or exploiting
earlier decisions by a defendant that now render incriminating evidence available to the
government." Id. (emphasis added).
125. See M. Berger, supra note 115, at 190.
126. See id. at 161, 163, 178; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2263, at 378; Organiza-
tional Papers, supra note 10, at 645.
127. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); United States v.
Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1217-20 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally C. McCormick, supra
note 11, § 140, at 345 (discussing waiver by disclosure of incriminating facts); 8 J. Wig-
more, supra note 7, § 2276(b)(1), at 456-57 (same).
128. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); id. at 379 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
129. In Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court stated that
"the privilege which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained in relation to
'records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of
transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the en-
forcement of restrictions validly established.'" Id. at 33 (quoting Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)). Limitations on the required records exception were
subsequently developed in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965) and in a trilogy of
cases-Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). See California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 429 (1971). See generally C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 142, at 350-53 (dis-
cussing limitations on the required records exception); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7,
§ 2259c(2), at 362-67 (same). To qualify as a required record, three requirements must be
satisfied: first, the statute's purpose must be essentially regulatory; second, the records
must be the kind customarily kept by the regulated party; and third, the records must
have assumed "public aspects." See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
130. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 380 (1911); see also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 5, 32-33 (1948) (be-
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an accident involving property damage can be compelled by statute to
stop and give his name and address to a police officer, 3 I despite the testi-
monial admission that he was involved in an accident, that he believes
that property damage occurred and that the name and address given are
authentic. 132
In the required records and the "stop and report" cases, the fifth
amendment does not apply because regulatory concerns override the in-
dividual's privilege. 33 The Supreme Court has held that the tension be-
tween the government's need for information and the fifth amendment is
resolved by "balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individ-
ual claim to constitutional protection on the other."'" In many situa-
tions, the possibility that compliance with a disclosure requirement may
incriminate the individual cannot defeat the public need for disclosure. 135
cause privilege held not to apply, individual must produce required records). In the case
of required records, the government can compel both creation and production of the
documents without running afoul of the fifth amendment See C. McCormick, supra note
11, § 142, at 350; Heidt, supra note 20, at 475.
131. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 426-27, 433-34 (1971).
132. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 474-75. The required records exception removes the
fifth amendment's protection from any direct or implied testimonial authentication of
other disclosures inherent in the act of producing the records. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979); C. McCormick, supra note 11, § 142, at
353.
133. See, eg., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427, 430 (1971) (public policy to pro-
mote civil liability in car accidents outweighs risk of incrimination in requiring drivers to
stop and report to police); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948) (records
required for commodity price regulation in wartime not inconsistent with fifth amend-
ment); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 166-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (records
required by U.S. Customs Service for regulation of customshouse brokerage offices not
subject to privilege); In re Morris Thrift Pharmacy, 397 So. 2d 1301, 1304-05 (La. 1981)
(records of prices charged by pharmacies in Medicaid provider program not within scope
of privilege); Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 328-30, 305 A.2d 845, 854-55 (re-
quired records of funds entrusted to lawyers by clients not within scope of privilege), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973); State Real Estate Comm'n v. Roberts, 441 Pa. 159, 161,
164-65, 271 A.2d 246, 247-49 (1970) (escrow accounts of real estate brokers are required
records not within scope of privilege), cert denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
134. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971).
135. See id. at 428. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Noting that organized
society imposes many burdens on its constituents, the Byers Court listed examples of
situations in which "the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the
strong policies in favor of a disclosure," as follows:
[Society] commands the filing of tax returns for income; it requires producers
and distributors of consumer goods to file informational reports on the manu-
facturing process and the content of products, on the wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions of employees. Those who borrow money in the public market or
issue securities for sale to the public must file various informational reports;
industries must report periodically the volume and content of pollutants dis-
charged into our waters and atmosphere. Comparable examples are legion.
Id. at 427-28.
Thus, registered broker-dealers accused of fraudulent sale of securities and other viola-
tions of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 77x
(1982), must produce documents whose existence and safekeeping were required by Se-
curities & Exchange Commission regulations. See United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d
240, 247 (2d Cir. 1970). Similarly, a psychiatrist accused of large-scale distribution of
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Disclosure requirements, however, are not without limitation. A stat-
ute cannot be aimed at a "highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities,"'' 36 whose mere compliance with the statute would, in
almost every conceivable circumstance, be incriminating. 137 On the
other hand, statutes that are "neutral on their face and directed at the
public at large"'' 38 for an essentially regulatory purpose do not conflict
with the fifth amendment. 39 Thus, although prosecutorial needs alone
do not suffice to imply a waiver,'40 the privilege can be impliedly waived
to accommodate a broad regulatory purpose. To permit government ac-
cess to required records for essentially non-criminal purposes, the custo-
dian of required records impliedly waives his privilege on assuming
custody of the documents.'41 His privilege cannot be revived merely be-
cause the same information later becomes relevant to a criminal
investigation. 4
controlled substances must produce his W-2 forms, prescription forms and patient files
because they are required records to which the privilege does not apply. In re Doe, 711
F.2d 1187, 1191-94 (2d Cir. 1983). Despite the producer's compelled, self-incriminating
testimony, the fifth amendment does not apply to required records because the public
interest "overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise ap-
ply." Id. at 1192.
136. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (quoting Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968)).
137. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). In Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968), the Court concluded that compliance with a federal statute requiring
payment of an occupational gambling tax would have incriminated the payer in almost
every conceivable circumstance. See id. at 48-49.
138. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (quoting Albertson v. SACB, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).
139. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (quoting Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S.
70, 79 (1965)).
140. See Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 652-54. The Harvard note assumes
that the collective entity rule serves purely prosecutorial needs and is therefore invalid,
See id. On the contrary, a broad survey of corporate misconduct done for the Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of
corporate misconduct and government enforcement efforts involve civil and administra-
tive violations. See Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and
Scholarship, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 501, 506-08 (1980) (analyzing M. Clinard, P. Yeager,
J. Brissetter, D. Petrashek & E. Harries, Illegal Corporate Behavior 257-60 (1979)).
141. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 381 (1911). The Wilson Court ex-
plained the implied waiver theory as follows:
The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases, is that where, by
virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them, the books and
papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custo-
dian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to crimi-
nate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the incident obligation to
permit inspection.
Id.
142. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 448 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
Byers, Justice Harlan commented on the relationship between the privilege and compet-
ing public interests:
But it would not follow that the constitutional values protected by the [privi-
lege]. . . are of such overriding significance that they compel substantial sacri-
fices in the efficient pursuit of other governmental objectives in all situations
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Applying the required records standards by analogy to the collective
entity rule demonstrates the propriety of implying a waiver to ensure
effective regulation of corporate conduct. Neither keeping corporate
records nor conducting the business typically recorded in corporate doc-
uments is inherently illegal. 4 3 Merely complying with a governmental
request for corporate documents generally does not result in self-incrimi-
nation.1" The duty to produce corporate records primarily serves a reg-
ulatory purpose14 5 and is not aimed at a "highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities.""' Thus, implying a waiver of
the corporate custodian's personal privilege does not violate the stan-
dards set for denying the privilege in other areas that involve an overrid-
ing public interest in disclosure.
B. Need for Implied Waiver
The need to regulate corporate conduct dictates that a corporate custo-
dian should not be allowed to invoke his own privilege with respect to the
production of corporate documents. 47 Allowing the custodian of corpo-
rate records to resist production of those records would obstruct the only
avenue of access to corporate documents available to the government.148
For example, without access to the documents, the government may not
where the pursuit of those objectives requires the disclosure of information
which will undoubtedly significantly aid in criminal law enforcement.
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
For instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) announced
recently that, in its largest enforcement action ever, it will seek SI.4 million in fines
against the Union Carbide Corporation for its willful disregard for health and safety at its
West Virginia plant. Noble, Union Carbide Faces Fine of $1.4 Million on Safety Viola-
tions, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1986, at Al, col. 3. "The plant is the only United States
manufacturer of methyl isocyanate, the chemical that leaked from Carbide's plant in
Bhopal, India in December, 1984, and killed at least 2,000 people." Id. at A1S, col. 1.
Union Carbide noted that most of the alleged violations involved paperwork. Id. at AIS,
col. 3. OSHA cited the corporation for improper recordkeeping and failure to follow
regulations for recording injuries and illnesses. Id. at A15, col. 4. The results of OSHA's
six-month investigation were sent to the Justice Department for possible criminal prose-
cution because OSHA can only impose civil penalties. Id. at A15, col. 1. If the privilege
were available to the custodians of Union Carbide's records, they are likely to have
claimed their privilege on the ground of self-incrimination. The custodians' claim of priv-
ilege would have deprived OSHA of access to documents essential to its regulatory func-
tion merely because the compelled testimony might later tend to incriminate these
custodians.
143. Cf. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 439 (1971) ("Driving and automobile, un-
like gambling, is a lawful activity").
144. See G. Lilly, Evidence § 92, at 340 (1978).
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("This group, numbering as it
does in the millions, is so large as to render [the statute in question] a statute 'directed at
the public at large' ") (quoting Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); Orland, supra
note 140, at 506-08 (indicating that corporate misconduct is predominantly civil and ad-
ministrative in nature).
147. See supra notes 1-7, 47-52, 61, 66 and accompanying text.
148. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 488. See supra notes 4-7, 51-52, 66-67 and accompa-
nying text.
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have sufficient information for a search warrant.' 49 More significantly, a
custodial privilege may immunize a price-fixing conspiracy, for instance,
by precluding any access to the only memorandum of the agreement.' 50
If officers of two corporations are the only individuals with knowledge of
the memorandum sufficient to produce and authenticate it, a custodial
privilege would shield the two corporations from antitrust
prosecution.15'
The Second Circuit would allow a corporate representative to invoke
his personal privilege on the theory that a corporation can still produce
the documents by hiring a new agent who can respond to the subpoena
without fear of self-incrimination." 2 Requiring a corporation to hire a
new agent, however, would not eliminate the de facto corporate privilege.
Because a corporation can only act through its agents, the responsibility
for hiring the new agent and for leading him to the requested documents
would ultimately fall to a corporate employee. 5 3 The employee's act of
hiring the new agent would, however, testify as to his authority to do
so."' His act of leading the agent to the requested documents would
result in implicit authentication of those documents. 55 Thus, the em-
ployee is likely to rely on his privilege against self-incrimination to avoid
assisting the corporation in complying with the subpoena. If every agent
capable of hiring and assisting the new agent declines to do so for fear of
self-incrimination, the new agent cannot produce the documents. 5 6
Consequently, the Second Circuit's approach does not address the gov-
ernment's need for access to corporate documents.
It has been suggested that the collective entity rule is unnecessary be-
149. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 488.
150. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 536 (3d. Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(Garth, J., dissenting).
151. See id.
152. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir.
1985) (citing United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1356 (1985)). The Third Circuit seems to agree with the Second Circuit. See In re
Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 529 (3d. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
153. Cf. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1911) ("[A court order] served
on the corporation ... [is] equivalent to a command that the persons [representing the
corporation] shall do what is required.").
154. Whether the compelled act is a testimonial communication depends on whether it
supplies a necessary link in the evidentiary chain. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985). If the
compelled act confirms something that was previously unknown to the government or
supplies an assurance of authenticity not available from other sources, then it would be a
testimonial communication. Id. Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined
testimonial acts, see Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 645, it is reasonable to infer
that a corporate agent's act of hiring someone on behalf of the corporation testifies as to
his authority to do so.
155. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) ("The act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena ... would indicate the [producer's] belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.").
156. This result would be especially likely in the case of a professional or closely-held
corporation.
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cause the government can gain access to corporate documents by grant-
ing use immunity to the custodian.157 This reasoning begs the question.
Regardless of the need for the rule, use immunity is irrelevant to the
custodian of corporate papers because it is required only as a substitute
for a legitimate fifth amendment privilege.1 58 To grant immunity to an
individual who has already waived his privilege would, in effect, grant a
new privilege in exchange for documents to which the government is al-
ready entitled."5 9 In any case, if waiver is unnecessary due to the availa-
bility of use immunity, then it is unnecessary in all situations in which
the Supreme Court implies a waiver."6 For example, the custodian of
required records would be entitled to use immunity in exchange for pro-
duction.16 1 This result would contradict the Supreme Court's holding in
Shapiro v. United StatesI62 because Congress "did not intend to frustrate
the use of those records for enforcement action by granting an immunity
bonus to individuals compelled to disclose their required records."' 63
Granting use immunity to the corporate custodian would frustrate the
government's efforts at effective law enforcement. Theoretically, this ar-
rangement would immunize only the testimony inherent in the act of
production and not the contents of the documents.' In practice, use
157. Congress has provided for government grants of use immunity with respect to
potentially incriminating evidence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1982); see also Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448, 453 (1972) (declaring statutory use immunity consti-
tutional). To satisfy the requirements of the fifth amendment, a grant of use immunity
need be only as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 n.17 (1984); Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253 & n.8 (1983);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 107 (1964) (White, J., concurring). Since use immunity removes the threat of
self-incrimination, the privilege ceases to apply to the claimant. See C. McCormick,
supra note 11, § 143, at 354; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2282, at 509. The prosecution,
however, must affirmatively prove that the evidence it offers is derived from a legitimate
source wholly independent of the previously immunized testimony. See Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
158. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1948); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594
(1985).
159. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1948).
160. The Harvard note interprets the required records exception as support for creat-
ing a new privilege for corporate custodians. See Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at
653. Ironically, its arguments against the representative capacity doctrine-that the priv-
ilege applies whenever the act of production constitutes self-incriminating testimony and
the availability of use immunity-would invalidate the required records exception as well.
Both the collective entity rule and the required records exception have roots in Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911). See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17
(1948); Meltzer, supra note 57, at 703, 709. The custodian's act of production is equally
incriminating in either case. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 474-78. If the Harvard note is
correct, the Supreme Court in Fisher and Doe implicitly overruled Wilson, the required
records exception and the collective entity rule though none of them were at issue.
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
163. Id. at 7.
164. See Organizational Papers, supra note 10, at 651. Since the grant of immunity is
coextensive with the fifth amendment, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
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immunity does not guarantee access to the contents of corporate docu-
ments. To the contrary, it may effectively immunize the contents of the
documents in addition to any testimonial aspects of the act of produc-
tion. If the act of production testifies to the existence and possession of
the subpoenaed documents, 165 then the grant of immunity would pre-
clude the government from using the content of the document in the
custodian's subsequent prosecution.1 66 Because the contents could not
have been obtained without the act of production testimony, the content
constitutes the "direct fruit" of the immunized testimony and is therefore
also subject to the immunity. 167 Use immunity would thus deprive both
the act of production and the content of the papers of any evidentiary
value.
Moreover, use immunity nullifies the possibility of prosecuting the cus-
todian.16 1 Once immunity is granted, the government must prove the
unprovable in order to prosecute the custodian-that it has made no use,
evidentiary or otherwise, of the implicit testimony. 169 For instance, the
prosecution would have to prove not only that its evidence was indepen-
dently obtained, 7 ' but also that it had not used the act of production
testimony to interpret evidence,17' to plan the cross-examination, 172 to
plot trial strategy or even to proceed with the case.' 7 3 Prosecuting the
producer of the documents would be very difficult without using the act
of production testimony for at least one of these purposes.' 74 It is ques-
tionable whether corporate crime would be effectively deterred if only the
artificial entity were punished and not the individuals responsible for the
crimes. 75 Thus, implied waiver, not use immunity, ensures effective gov-
54 (1964), the privilege need only protect the producer from the self-incrimination inher-
ent in his act of production. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 n.17 (1984).
Normally, the content of the documents is not protected by the privilege. See id. at 612.
165. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
166. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1976) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Heidt, supra note 20, at 482 n.172.
167. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1976) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Heidt, supra note 20, at 482 n.172.
168. See Heidt, supra note 20, at 488.
169. See id. at 481 n.172, 488.
170. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); C. McCormick, supra
note 11, § 143, at 355-56; Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination: The Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Im-
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ernment regulation of corporate misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Fisher and Doe did nothing to affect the collective entity rule. Rather,
the Supreme Court shifted the fifth amendment inquiry from the con-
tents of private documents to the testimony inherent in their production.
In reducing the scope of the fifth amendment with respect to personal
documents, the Supreme Court did not extend it to documents held in a
representative capacity.
Instead, Fisher and Doe confirmed that a corporate custodian im-
pliedly waives his privilege by voluntarily accepting custody of the docu-
ments. The custodian waives his privilege to allow effective regulation of
the corporation he represents. Moreover, the regulatory rationale under-
lying the collective entity rule is even stronger today than it was eighty
years ago. Due to the complexity of modem transactions and technol-
ogy, the detection, investigation and prosecution of corporate crime re-
quires even greater access to documentary information. Since the
corporate representative enjoys the benefits of the corporate form, it is
only fair that he be required to accept its incidental obligations. The
regulatory needs of the state often override the individual's privilege
without violating the fifth amendment. Thus, construing Fisher and Doe
as extending the fifth amendment to custodians of corporate documents,
though ostensibly advancing an individual's liberties, would obstruct the
regulation of economically powerful entities capable of causing great
harm to society.
Arthur Y.D. Ong
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